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Background: The Barclay cigarette (Brown & Williamson) was introduced in 1980 in the USA in the most
expensive launch in history. In the USA and around the world, Barclay was later determined to have a
grooved filter design that was compromised by human smokers in the normal act of smoking, but that was
measured as ultra-low tar using the standard tar testing protocol.
Objectives: To evaluate whether Brown & Williamson knew of the compensatability of Barclay during the
design process and before it was released; to evaluate initial responses of competing tobacco companies
to Barclay, before complaints were made to the Federal Trade Commission in 1981.
Methods: Internet databases of industry documents (Tobacco Documents Online, Legacy Tobacco
Documents Library, Brown & Williamson Litigation discovery website, Guildford and major company
websites) were searched using key words, key dates, and targeted searches. Documents related
specifically to the development, evaluation and release of the Barclay cigarette and related to the
responses by competing tobacco companies were examined.
Results: Documents indicate the manufacturer was aware of Barclay design problems and was planning,
before release, to respond to criticism. Competing companies quickly detected the filter groove stratagem
and considered developing their own similar filter, but eventually backed off.
Conclusion: The design problems with Barclay were readily understood by cigarette manufacturers,
including the maker of Barclay, before official governmental evaluations occurred. Testing involving
measured exposures to human smokers may in the end be crucial to identifying problems with novel
cigarette designs.
I
n 1980, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company (B&W),
an affiliate of the British-American Tobacco Company
(BAT), was described by a leading business magazine
as a ‘‘troubled’’ company that was ‘‘betting its future’’ on
Barclay,1 its first ultra-low tar cigarette and object of the
largest cigarette launch in history ($150 million in 1980,
equal to about $340 million today). Remarkably, the 1 mg tar
King Size (3 mg tar 100 mm) cigarette broke sales records for
a new cigarette within months of release.2
Ultimately, the original Barclay cigarette was found in the
USA and around the world to circumvent official tar test-
ing programmes.3 Much more so than other vented filter
cigarettes, this ultra-low tar brand became a much higher tar
cigarette in the hands and mouths of smokers than in the
ports of official smoking machines. Because of its special
grooved filter (fig 1), Barclay made it unavoidable for most
smokers to compromise the filter ventilation system and
compensate for reduced standard yields. Conventional
ventilated filters allow diluting air to enter through vent
holes that let smoke and air mix within the filter. Such a
design allows behavioural blocking of air intake dilution
holes.4 Barclay’s grooves or channels were formed using a
non-porous filter plug wrap that kept the diluting air separate
from the rest of the filter. When these grooves became less
effective, the entire ventilation system was compromised. On
Barclay, air exit grooves as well as air intake holes could be
blocked by smokers.4 In the course of normal smoking
behaviours, the grooved dilution filter became compromised
either by lips or fingers causing the air dilution channels to
collapse or by lips blocking the exit of diluting air to the
mouth. The filter ventilation system on Barclay functioned in
a standard smoking machine test because the holding device
on the machine used very little pressure compared to that
arising from lips, fingers, and vigorous puffing.
It has been public knowledge that complaints from a
competitor, the RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR), led
to an investigation by the US Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)2 5 and to open expressions of concern from other com-
petitors. Once the FTC investigation began, Barclay was seen
by most of the rest of the industry as a design that went too
far toward being a compensatible product (copies of industry
positions in the proceedings can be found here6 7). Industry
behaviour before the FTC got involved provides historical
insight into company principles and practices during the
1980s.
The public position of B&W was expressed in December
1981 by the chairman of the board, Dr IW Hughes, in a
videotaped statement played as part of a press conference:
‘‘Now I would like to state quite clearly that Brown &
Williamson adheres strictly to the highest ethical practices in
its business. We developed and marketed BARCLAY honestly
and we stand behind everything we say about the product to
the consumer.’’8
This report focuses on evidence from tobacco industry
documents on the pre-history and early history of Barclay
cigarettes in the USA. We explored documentary evidence
of knowledge of the effects of the design before the FTC
became involved in examining the product in 1981. Had the
manufacturer been aware of Barclay’s design problems before
Abbreviations: BAT, British American Tobacco; B&W, Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Company; FTC, Federal Trade Commission; ISO,
International Organization for Standardization; RJR, RJ Reynolds
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selling the product? What did competitors know before the
matter came before the FTC?
DATA SOURCES AND SEARCH PROCEDURES
The origin of the internal tobacco industry documents
available for analysis is described by Katz and Lavack.9 The
following databases were searched: Tobacco Documents
Online (http://tobaccodocuments.org/), Legacy Tobacco
Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu), the
Brown & Williamson Litigation Discovery website (http://
www.bwdocs.com/public.asp), and British Columbia’s
Guildford Depository collection (http://www.healthservices.-
gov.bc.ca/guildford/). We also searched all of the tobacco
company websites directly.
Overlapping and integrated search strategies based on key
words, key dates, and targeted for specific documents were
used. Websites were searched for specific words singly and
in combination, including but not limited to: ‘‘Barclay’’,
‘‘Actron’’, ‘‘compensation’’, ‘‘patent’’, ‘‘groove’’, ‘‘grooved’’,
‘‘grooves’’, ‘‘channel’’, ‘‘collapse’’, and ‘‘ultra low tar.’’ As we
read documents, more targeted searches were done using the
names of projects (for example, ‘‘Omega’’, ‘‘Brand B’’) and
key persons involved (for example, Johnson, Reynolds,
Sanford, Gravely, Riehl, Alar, McCafferty, Silberstein).
Because chronology was important, we searched websites
using key dates and date ranges. A document identified
early in the search, ‘‘Development milestones of the Actron
Filter’’,10 helped guide us. We also searched for very specific
documents that we suspected or knew had existed (that is,
those referenced in other documents or that might be more
complete copies of documents we had already found). We
used key words, names, specific dates and/or Bates numbers
preceding or following numbers on the documents we had.
For example, we searched for all B&W documents includ-
ing the name of Johnson (the Barclay inventor) from 1978
to 1981 and searching for ‘‘244’’ (a relevant project) and
‘‘notebook’’ produced laboratory notebooks.
These strategies were used by 2–6 searchers, depending on
the search, in multiple sites, to minimise chances of missing
germane documents. Approximately 1200 documents of
interest were downloaded and catalogued by date, document
author, and Bates number. A master file with all documents
included was constructed and searched before adding new
documents to prevent duplication. Documents were read,
studied, and discussed between at least two of the authors.
RESULTS
Conception, development, and market release of
Barclay: 1978 to 1981
A period of nearly four years elapsed between the initial
conception of the grooved filter in September 1978 and the
final ruling by the FTC in June 1982. For a further account of
developments following the ruling until March 1987, see
Philip Morris.3 Our primary focus is on the period from 1978
until the time the FTC became involved in 1981 (table 1).
B&W documents show prior knowledge of the ease of
compensation issues with the grooved filter
There is converging evidence from the B&W documents that
indicate that B&W scientists quickly identified the source
of easy compensation (that is, smokers getting much higher
smoke yields than indicated by standard testing), and
notified company executives early on.
The inventor of the filter, RR Johnson, expressed interest in
the issue of groove collapse and the possibility of having
designed a compensatible cigarette on 11 December 1978 in a
memo sent to five others with significant positions in B&W
(Dr RA Sanford, Director of Research and Development;
TF Riehl, Division Head Products; ML Reynolds, Department
Head; EF Litzinger, Section Leader; TG Strubel, Area
Supervisor, Licensing and Liaison). He wrote, ‘‘We seem to
have found a cigarette that shows low deliveries on machine
smoking and much higher deliveries when people smoke it.
One possible explanation is loss of filter ventilation by
collapse of tipping into the grooves during hard puffing.’’92
Remarkably, the official laboratory notebook entries during
this same time period, from 22 September 1978, when the
design conception was entered into his official laboratory
notebook,12 through 15 December 1978, make no mention of
this concern about groove collapse, even though the 12
December notebook entry contains the same numerical
analytical results as reported in the memo of 11 December.
As is standard for laboratory notebooks in industry in the
USA (where priority of conception can be key to resolving
patent disputes), each numbered notebook page is signed
and dated by the author and witnessed, signed, and dated
by two others. The failure to include the observation on




Figure 1 A diagram of the Barclay cigarette showing the air dilution
grooves in the filter plug, and the air intake (ventilation) holes in the
tipping paper. The filter is covered with a non-porous plug wrap before
grooving. This non-porous plug wrap prevented diluting air from
diverting to enter the filter plug and passing into the smoker’s mouth, if
the channels were blocked or compressed. Therefore Barclay was subject
to air intake vents being blocked as well as air exit grooves being
blocked. A common type of ventilated filter cigarette would not have
grooved channels and would use porous plug wrap, so blocking air exit
to the mouth would not be an issue.
Table 1 Chronology of development and release of the
Barclay cigarette in the USA
September 1978 Conception of grooved filter by RR Johnson at
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company12
September
1978–1980
Ongoing projects on grooved or fluted
filters11 93 94
September 1980 Test market release of Barclay cigarette95
7 September 1980 Thomas Ahrensfeld, VP, General Counsel for
Philip Morris, phones Ernest Pepples, B&W, to
discuss why Barclay produces a ‘‘higher level of
satisfaction to smokers than other 1 mg tar
cigarettes’’ and that their ‘‘technical people had
developed a reason why they believe this is so’’96
September–
November 1980
American Tobacco, Philip Morris, Lorillard, and
RJ Reynolds tobacco companies determined that
Barclay delivers more smoke to smokers than to
the standard smoking machine largely because
of groove compromise (table 2)
January 1981—
March 1981
Nationwide release of Barclay cigarette, rising to
sales of 1.2% during the first quarter of 198184
June 1981 FTC started informal investigation as a result of
complaint by RJR Tobacco Company96
June 1982 FTC ‘‘concluded Barclay was inaccurately
measured by the FTC method and that the
cigarette actually delivered between three and
seven milligrams of tar when smoked by the
human being’’97
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violates standard laboratory practices. In the 15 December
1978 notebook entry, Johnson does provide data on the
possibility that the strong taste was related to the very low
pressure drop and changes in ventilation level with ‘‘more
intense and bigger puffs’’.13 Though this entry is related to
compensation, it is not in direct pursuit of the issue of
‘‘collapse of tipping into the grooves’’.
In late 1979, Johnson’s annual performance review
notes: ‘‘His ‘‘grooved filter’’ is corporately considered to be
a technical breakthrough and our first innovative filter since
Duolite. The fact that B&W’s next market entry will likely
carry a ‘‘grooved’’ filter is largely due to Bob’s diligence,
persistence, enthusiasm and technical expertise.’’14 His
‘‘development plans’’ for 1980 are: ‘‘Further understanding
of how/why ‘grooved filter’ affects smoke chemistry and
smoke quality.’’
A strategic plan written five months before Barclay’s test
market indicates executive concern about extreme compen-
sation. On 26 March 1980, clearly dated draft planning
documents written by RA Sanford, then director of research
and development, state: ‘‘Further, recognizing our concen-
tration on grooved filter developments, we should develop a
contingency plan for controlling the ease of compensation, if
in the future, the product is excessively criticized. Here we
might have to adjust the product to match the most flexible
of our low tar competition.’’15 This document demonstrates
high level knowledge—incorporated in planning documents
that went to the board of directors and president of B&W (see
the slight revision in final planning documents in 1980).16
It was not until 25 April 1980 that Johnson’s laboratory
notebook referred again to the issue of groove collapse.13 The
notebook page is entitled, ‘‘Invention disclosures grooved
filter cigarettes’’, and describes a scotch tape reinforced
grooved filter of which he notes: ‘‘Cigarette taste was not
changed and tipping could not be collapsed into the grooves
with the most rigorous puff I could take.’’13 This indicates
that without reinforcement, puffing could collapse tipping
into grooves as he had noted 14 months earlier. A related
formal ‘‘Invention disclosure’’ memo dated 22 April 1980
indicates: ‘‘The purpose is to prevent smokers from distorting
the grooves by taking particularly strong puffs.’’17 These
notebook entries and disclosures set the stage for patent
protection for variants of the grooved filter. We could not find
evidence that this modified filter was used in Barclay.
Competitors readily identified the grooved filter
problem within weeks
Each manufacturer maintains a system for assessing how
competing products work as soon as they come on the
market. It is routine to reverse engineer cigarettes as soon as
they become available in test market. Within weeks all four
major cigarette companies determined the basic design issues
involved with Barclay (table 2). Evaluations by these com-
panies included systematic taste tests, modified smoking
machine analyses, and experimental studies of human
smokers smoking Barclay with or without a holder as used
in the FTC test. Two of the companies even used scanning
electron microscopes to examine the filter—advanced and
expensive technology for 1980.18 19
To save space, we use two quotations from each manu-
facturer and provide references for additional documents
related to their early evaluation of Barclay (American,20–25
Lorillard,26–35 Philip Morris,36–45 RJR46–60) (table 2).
These excerpts from longer documents demonstrate that
industry experts readily figured out the problem with groove
compromise. Also note that the perception by smokers of
stronger taste and more smoke than usual for a 1 mg tar
cigarette were key clues for their initial analyses.
Table 2 Early evaluations of Barclay’s functioning by competing companies
Date Company Title Quotations
9 September 1980 LOR Barclay ‘‘… visually Barclay (1 mg) 85 appears to have 2 to 3 times as much smoke as the
Carlton (1mg) 85’’26
22 September 1980 LOR Crude tar yields for Barclay 84’s at
different puff volumes
‘‘The Barclay filter generally collapses when smoked by humans which may result in
higher tar deliveries’’27
14 October 1980 ATC Measurement of ventilation effects,
Barclay KS & Carlton (83) soft pack
‘‘The slot design of the Barclay filter when smoked by machine apparently remains
intact and gives low tar delivery. However, when a smoker’s lips close around the
filter and dampens it, the slots tend to close up, giving the smoker a much higher
delivery of smoke’’21
14 November 1980 ATC Barclay cigarettes ‘‘It becomes apparent that the lips of a smoker serve to restrict air flow through the
filter tip air dilution system of Barclay cigarettes by partially sealing off the four
grooves in the filter, thereby causing a larger proportion of the puff volume to be
drawn through the tobacco column’’22
10 September 1980 RJR Barclay cigarettes ‘‘…it is clear that the use of cigarette holders which apply more pressure on the
filter (Chemical Division holders) results in a substantially higher TPM delivery. It
appears that the pressure on the filter such as that a smoker applies during a puff
causes the tipping to collapse into the groove’’48
20 October 1980 RJR Barclay evaluation under human
smoking conditions
‘‘It was found during initial testing that pressure applied to the filter caused the
tipping to collapse into the grooves, causing an increase in mouthend draft.
Additionally, it was shown that TPM deliveries rose dramatically when these
cigarettes were smoked with holders that applied the ‘‘squeezing’’ action on the
filter. It was speculated that when humans smoked the cigarettes, pressure from the
lips caused the same tipping collapse and thus produced smoking qualities very
different from other cigarettes with ,1 mg/cig FTC ‘tar’ deliveries… It is also
speculated that an even greater increase in TPM delivery might be obtained if the
smoker were allowed to manually handle the filter and further collapse the tipping
through finger pressure’’55
16 September 1980 PM Report on the Barclay cigarette ‘‘Product smokes differently in smoker’s mouth than in dental dam of smoking
machine. Smoker’s lips close channels (grooves) between tipping paper and filter
lowering dilution and resulting in higher tar delivery’’36
29 September 1980 PM Status of Barclay studies ‘‘This filter design results in some unusual delivery characteristics when smoked by
a human that do not occur during machine smoking…The dilution decrease to the
[human] smoker results in substantially higher tar delivery than would be the case of
a conventionally diluted all CA [cellulose acetate] filter…Subjective impressions by
flavor development have corroborated the higher tar estimates…filter process
development to either duplicate or simulate the Barclay effect is in progress’’40
ATC, American Tobacco Company; LOR, Lorillard; PM, Philip Morris; RJR, RJ Reynolds.
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B&W’s response to the competitor’s challenges
B&W documents speak repeatedly of ‘‘very strong’’,61
‘‘surprisingly strong’’,62 ‘‘packs a fearful punch’’,63 and a
‘‘mouthful of smoke’’64 (rather than the mouthful of air to be
expected from some comparisons to a 1 mg.tar, ‘‘80%’’ ven-
tilated cigarette), and yet, in contrast to other companies, we
found nearly no speculation on what explained this power-
ful and surprising effect within the B&W documents before
other companies started to complain. The B&W marketing
research even showed that this new ultra-low tar cigarette
would generally be too strong for other ultra-low tar smokers
and would be more appealing to those smoking cigarettes in
the low tar range.65 Before the other companies started to
complain, one B&W document raised a question about the
cause of the ‘‘considerable and perhaps unexpected amount
of taste’’, but the focus was on what might be special about
the tobacco blend, not on the filter.66
B&W did not admit to the groove collapse problem when
competitors shared their assessments, but instead developed
an alternative explanation for Barclay’s good taste based on
air and smoke swirling together in the mouth. In a series
of memos in late 1980, B&W scientists Don Silberstein
and Drew McMurtrie described an elaborate aerodynamical
theory, based loosely on ‘‘Coanda turbulence’’ (named for an
early jet aircraft designer), stating in a ‘‘File note’’67 ‘‘The
grooved filter works in part because smoke and ventilating
air mix in the smoker’s mouth’’, and later, ‘‘When entering
a person’s mouth, the air exiting the grooves will pull sur-
rounding air from the mouth and mix it with incoming
tobacco smoke’’.68 This explanation became a key element of
the defence of Barclay and appeared in videos and adver-
tisements (fig 2). A marketing brochure from this time period
describes ‘‘The inside story of the ACTRON filter’’ as follows:
‘‘But with the revolutionary ACTRON design, air and smoke
each travel through completely separate channels– the air
moving at 5 times the speed of the smoke. They swirl together
for the first time as they enter and billow throughout the
entire mouth. That’s ACTRON’s aerodynamic action, created
by the strategic positioning of the air grooves. That’s the
‘‘mouthful of smoke’’ you taste with Barclay.’’69
Before the FTC became involved, competing
companies explored making their own version of the
deceptive Barclay fi lter
An early reaction of Philip Morris, RJR, and American57 58 70
was that they should each try to build their own version of
the grooved filter and speculation that they might already
possess a patent that would protect such a design for them.47
Philip Morris in September began ‘‘Project Grow’’ to develop
their own version of Barclay.71 We could find no evidence that
these products were ever marketed.
DISCUSSION
B&W had knowledge that the Barclay fi lter was a
defective design
The documents provide evidence that B&Wmanagement and
the Barclay inventor knew that Barclay provided the taste
and smoke of a cigarette with a higher tar delivery because of
how its filter performed when smoked by human smokers.
Within weeks of discovery, the inventor of record proposed
that the collapse of the filter was responsible for the
remarkable taste from this type of cigarette. Planning
documents indicate that B&W was prepared to reduce the
compensatory effect if criticism was too great. Other com-
panies identified the filter problems of Barclay within weeks
of its release on the market, by reverse engineering it
themselves.
It is remarkable how consistently the B&W and BAT
documents provide no analysis of the groove collapse pro-
blem. Tobacco industry documents present important chal-
lenges for many reasons: a key document may be available
but not found or a key document may not be found because
it is unavailable. It is known that some documents from
B&W may have been moved to BAT in England.72 The BAT/
Guilford archive has been subject itself to criticism of the
security and quality of the documents available there.73 74
Because of these limitations, we can make no judgment on
whether documents are missing or if we were just unable to
locate them.
Why would a company knowingly market such a
deceptive design?
For all B&W knew, they would have had the typical com-
petitive advantage of a company coming first to market with
an innovation. The marketing of Barclay could be seen as a
calculated risk by a company in great need of a sales success.
Also, the deception arising from the grooved filter was only
greater than the deception involved with other ventilated
filter designs: it was not the first example of a compensatible
cigarette.4 Note that their ‘‘contingency plans’’ were essen-
tially to reduce the compensation potential from Barclay
and bring it more in line with the ‘‘flexibility’’ to be found
in some competing brands. B&W was merely the first com-
pany who gave an extremely compensatible cigarette a
commercial try.
The ‘‘swirl’’ concept seems to have arisen as a strategy or
diversion to draw attention away from collapse and deal with
external criticism, rather than as part of the development of
the grooved filter (for example, in Johnson’s work). Years
later (1985), WDE Irwin, a technician for BAT in England,
was asked how a grooved filter could be made that would
avoid criticism but also provide good taste. He concluded:
‘‘Finally for cigarettes, I believe it to be a self evident truth
not only is there no smoke without fire, but also there is no
kick without smoke.’’75 He also noted that he never accepted
the arguments about ‘‘swirl’’.
The ‘‘Barclay story’’ is particularly interesting in that RJR
was moved to go to the FTC to try to deal with the matter,
despite general reluctance to support regulation of tobacco
products. Representatives of RJR expressed concern that the
egregious problems with Barclay would ‘‘further impair the
credibility of the Industry vis-a`-vis Governments, the medical
establishment, etc. I know this with certainty to be the case
in West Germany, Great Britain, Canada and with less cer-
tainty for Switzerland.’’59 There was concern that ‘‘the
Figure 2 A Brown & Williamson marketing brochure’s depiction of the
ACTRON filter and ‘‘swirl’’ explanation for Barclay’s great taste. The
diagram shows air entering through the special grooves in the cigarette
and mixing together with smoke at the exit. This smoke and air mixture
supposedly swirled and mixed together in the mouth, creating a
‘‘mouthful of smoke’’ taste.
Barclay as compensatible by design 67
www.tobaccocontrol.com
concept of ‘‘beating the FTC’’ would be legitimized’’76 if
the FTC failed to act. While many of these same com-
panies actively pursued the development of Barclay type
designs,57 58 70 they were concerned that the design went
‘‘too far’’ and would damage the reputation of the industry
when ‘‘some anti-tobacco person will accuse Barclay of
misleading the public and criticize the entire industry for its
inaction’’.60
The Barclay episode indicates fundamental l imitations
with standard machine testing in cigarette
surveil lance
Surveillance is a cornerstone of public health. For decades
the main product surveillance system for cigarettes has
been the misleading FTC/International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) standard smoking-machine test.79–83
This standard test helped cause the public health tragedy of
the low tar cigarette.
A number of modifications of the official test protocols
have been suggested over the years to try to provide a fairer
basis for comparing brands. Some have suggested adding
a ‘‘maximum yield’’ heavy smoking and blocked vent
regimen.80 Others have proposed a simplified, two stage
compensating test.81 Still others have proposed flexible
regimens derived from smoking topography measures in
samples of smokers.82 We are not confident that any of these
procedures would have detected the Barclay problem which
would probably require modifying the smoking machine’s
cigarette holder to permit varying the pressure on the
cigarette. A ‘‘maximum-yield’’ test would not have detected
Barclay as a special problem. The issue with Barclay arose
because of the ease and unavoidability of attaining a high
yield. Testing involving measured exposures to human
smokers may in the end be crucial to identifying problems
with novel cigarette designs.83
Brand related cigarette sales should be part of
cigarette surveillance
In the months before RJR discussed changing the cigarette
holder in the FTC test, the documents indicate great concern
about the dramatic increase in sales.84 In December 1980,
Barclay was projected to pass the very significant 1% market
share level in 1981; RJR projected that these sales would
come in part from consumers of their brands and there was a
recognised need to take ‘‘appropriate counteraction’’.84 In
1986 B&W modified their filter to deal with the groove
collapse problem, and the FTC permitted a 3 mg tar rating.
The market share of Barclay fell from a peak of over 1.2%
in 1981 to less than 0.3% in 1990 (the most recent year for
which we have data).85
Monitoring cigarette sales may help detect especially
dangerous design innovations. From a public health stand-
point, a brand that sells well stands to kill many customers;
one that does not has a lower priority for public health
attention. A brand selling or increasing in sales by 1% (or
even 0.5%) of the market could be targeted for specialised
testing, including biomarkers in a sample of smokers. For
poorer countries, enhanced testing of better selling products
may be much more feasible than such testing of all products
on the market. The World Health Organization Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control provides guidance on other
tobacco control measures overall that are needed.86
Government and industry laboratories need not be the
only source of cigarette testing
We do support the creation of strong governmental regula-
tion for cigarettes and tobacco products. In absence of
such regulation, the current official, government sanctioned,
industry approved testing procedures are difficult to change.
Industry protection of the standard test may also be key to
its continued dominance.87 Just as non-governmental groups
can create, conduct, and report tests of automobile safety,
consumer interested88 or other organizations could create
and perform their own cigarette tests, even including
biomarkers in human smokers.81 89 In the US, two popular
magazines, Reader’s Digest90 and Consumer Reports91 first
commissioned and reported machine smoked tar tests years
before the government did. Perhaps further attention by such
groups could lead to new tests that: (1) are better informed
by what has been learned about the dangers of ‘‘low tar’’
cigarettes; and (2) would better inform consumers of dangers
from cigarettes.
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